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Abstract
In a landmark paper, Papadimitriou and Roughgarden [2008] described
a polynomial-time algorithm (“Ellipsoid Against Hope”) for computing
sample correlated equilibria of concisely-represented games. Recently,
Stein, Parrilo and Ozdaglar [2010] showed that this algorithm can fail
to find an exact correlated equilibrium, but can be easily modified to effi-
ciently compute approximate correlated equilibria. Currently, it remains
unresolved whether the algorithm can be modified to compute an exact
correlated equilibrium. We show that it can, presenting a variant of the
Ellipsoid Against Hope algorithm that guarantees the polynomial-time
identification of exact correlated equilibrium. Our new algorithm differs
from the original primarily in its use of a separation oracle that produces
cuts corresponding to pure-strategy profiles. As a result, we no longer
face the numerical precision issues encountered by the original approach,
and both the resulting algorithm and its analysis are considerably simpli-
fied. Our new separation oracle can be understood as a derandomization
of Papadimitriou and Roughgarden’s original separation oracle via the
method of conditional probabilities. Also, the equilibria returned by our
algorithm are distributions with polynomial-sized supports, which are sim-
pler (in the sense of being representable in fewer bits) than the mixtures
of product distributions produced previously; no tractable algorithm has
previously been proposed for identifying such equilibria.
1 Introduction
We consider the problem of computing a sample correlated equilibrium [Aumann,
1974; Aumann, 1987] given a finite, simultaneous-move game. It is known that
correlated equilibria of a game can be formulated as probability distributions
over pure strategy profiles satisfying certain linear constraints. The resulting
linear feasibility program has size polynomial in the size of the normal form rep-
resentation of the game. However, the size of the normal form representation
grows exponentially in the number of players. This is problematic when games
1
involve large numbers of players. Fortunately, most large games of practical
interest have highly-structured payoff functions, and thus it is possible to rep-
resent them compactly. A line of research thus exists to look for compact game
representations that are able to succinctly describe structured games, including
work on graphical games [Kearns et al., 2001] and action-graph games [Bhat &
Leyton-Brown, 2004; Jiang et al., 2010]. But now the size of the linear feasi-
bility program for CE can be exponential in the size of compact representation;
furthermore a CE can require exponential space to specify.
The “Ellipsoid Against Hope” algorithm [Papadimitriou, 2005; Papadim-
itriou & Roughgarden, 2008] is a polynomial-time method for identifying a
(polynomial-size representation of a) CE, given a game representation with poly-
nomial type and satisfying the polynomial expectation property. Many existing
compact game representations (including graphical games, symmetric games,
congestion games, polymatrix games and action-graph games) satisfy these prop-
erties. This important result extends CE’s attractive computational properties
to the case of compactly represented games; note in contrast that the problem
of finding a Nash equilibrium is PPAD-hard for normal form games [Chen &
Deng, 2006; Daskalakis & Papadimitriou, 2005] as well as for certain compact
game representations [Goldberg & Papadimitriou, 2006; Jiang et al., 2010].
At a high level, the Ellipsoid Against Hope algorithm works by solving an
infeasible dual LP (D) using the ellipsoid method (exploiting the existence of
a separation oracle), and arguing that the LP (D′) formed by the generated
cutting planes must also be infeasible. Solving the dual of this latter LP (which
has polynomial size) yields a CE, which is represented as a mixture of the
product distributions generated by the separation oracle.
1.1 Recent uncertainty about the complexity of exact CE
In a recent paper, Stein, Parrilo and Ozdaglar [2010] raised two interrelated
concerns about the Ellipsoid Against Hope algorithm. First, they identified a
symmetric 3-player, 2-action game with rational utilities on which the algorithm
can fail to compute an exact CE. Indeed, they showed that the same problem
arises on this game for a whole class of related algorithms. Specifically, if an
algorithm (a) outputs a rational solution, (b) outputs a convex combination
of product distributions, and (c) outputs a convex combination of symmetric
product distributions when the game is symmetric, then that algorithm must
fail to find an exact CE on their game, because the only CE of their game that
satisfies properties (b) and (c) has irrational probabilities. This implies that
any algorithm for exact rational CE must violate either (b) or (c).
Second, Stein, Parrilo and Ozdaglar also showed that the original analysis
in [Papadimitriou & Roughgarden, 2008] incorrectly handles certain numerical
precision issues, which we now briefly describe. Recall that a run of the ellipsoid
method requires as inputs an initial bounding ball with radius R and a volume
bound v such that the algorithm stops when the ellipsoid’s volume is smaller
than v. To correctly certify the (in)feasibility of an LP using the ellipsoid
method, R and v need to be set to appropriate values, which depend on the
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maximum encoding size of a constraint in the LP. However (as pointed out by
Papadimitriou and Roughgarden [2008]), each cut returned by the separation
oracle is a convex combination of the constraints of the original dual LP (D) and
thus may require more bits to represent than any of the constraints in (D); as
a result, the infeasibility of the LP (D′) formed by these cuts is not guaranteed.
Papadimitriou and Roughgarden [2008] proposed a method to overcome this
difficulty, but Stein et al. show that this method is insufficient for finding
an exact CE. For the related problem of finding an approximate correlated
equilibrium (ǫ-CE), Stein et al. give a slightly modified version of the Ellipsoid
Against Hope algorithm that runs in time polynomial in log 1ǫ and the game
representation size. For problems that can have necessarily irrational solutions,
it is standard to consider such approximations as efficient; however, there always
exists a rational CE in a game with rational utilities, since CE are defined by
linear constraints. It remains unresolved whether the Ellipsoid Against Hope
algorithm can be modified to compute an exact, rational correlated equilibrium.1
1.2 Our results
In this paper, we use an alternate approach—completely sidestepping the is-
sues just discussed—to derive a polynomial-time algorithm for computing an
exact (and rational) correlated equilibrium given a game representation that
has polynomial type and polynomial expectation property. Our algorithm has
features that give it theoretical and practical value independently of the severity
of the recently-identified issues in the original Ellipsoid Against Hope algorithm.
Specifically, our approach is based on the observation that if we use a separation
oracle (for the same dual LP formulation as in [Papadimitriou & Roughgarden,
2008]) that generates cuts corresponding to pure-strategy profiles (instead of
Papadimitriou and Roughgarden’s separation oracle that generates nontrivial
product distributions), then these cuts are actual constraints in the dual LP, as
opposed to the convex combinations of constraints produced by Papadimitriou
and Roughgarden’s separation oracle. As a result we no longer encounter the
numerical accuracy issues that prevented the previous approaches from finding
exact correlated equilibria. Both the resulting algorithm and its analysis are
also considerably simpler than the original: standard techniques from the the-
ory of the ellipsoid method are sufficient to show that our algorithm computes
an exact CE using a polynomial number of oracle queries.
The key issue is the identification of pure-strategy-profile cuts. It is rela-
tively straightforward to show that such cuts always exist: since the product
distribution generated by the Ellipsoid Against Hope algorithm ensures the non-
1In a recent online comment, Papadimitriou [2010] acknowledged the flaw in the original
Ellipsoid Against Hope algorithm, but expressed confidence that the numerical issues can
be overcome without dramatic changes (e.g., by using the repeated projection method due
to Karp and Papadimitriou [1980]), yielding a polynomial algorithm for exact CE. We note
also that, apparently believing that the issues they raised are not serious, Stein et al. have
very recently withdrawn their paper from arXiv. It is our impression that their results are
nevertheless still believed to be correct; we discuss them here because they help to motivate
our alternate approach.
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negativity of a certain expected value, then by a simple application of the prob-
abilistic method there must exist a pure-strategy profile that also ensures the
nonnegativity of that expected value. The key is to go beyond this nonconstruc-
tive proof of existence to also compute pure-strategy-profile cuts in polynomial
time. We show how to do this by applying the method of conditional probabili-
ties [Erdos & Selfridge, 1973; Spencer, 1994; Raghavan, 1988], an approach for
derandomizing probabilistic proofs of existence. At a high level, our new sepa-
ration oracle begins with the product distribution generated by Papadimitriou
and Roughgarden’s separation oracle, then sequentially fixes a pure strategy for
each player in a way that guarantees that the corresponding conditional expec-
tation given the choices so far remains nonnegative. Since our separation oracle
goes though players sequentially, the cuts generated can be asymmetric even
for symmetric games. Indeed, we can confirm (see Section 4.2) that it makes
such asymmetric cuts on Stein, Parrilo and Ozdaglar’s symmetric game—thus
violating their condition (c)—because our algorithm always identifies a rational
CE.
Another effect of our use of pure-strategy-profile cuts is that the correlated
equilibria generated by our algorithm are guaranteed to have polynomial-sized
supports; i.e., they are mixtures over a polynomial number of pure strategy pro-
files. Correlated equilibria with polynomial-sized supports are known to exist
in every game (e.g., [Germano & Lugosi, 2007]) but no tractable algorithm has
previously been proposed for identifying them. Such small-support correlated
equilibria have a simpler form than the mixtures of product distributions pro-
duced by the Ellipsoid Against Hope algorithm, and may have certain practical
advantages over the latter including requiring fewer bits to represent, being
easier to sample from, and being easier to verify.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We start with basic defini-
tions and notation in Section 2. In Section 3 we summarize Papadimitriou and
Roughgarden’s Ellipsoid Against Hope algorithm. In Section 4 we describe our
algorithm and prove its correctness, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
We largely follow the notation of Papadimitriou [2005] and Papadimitriou and
Roughgarden [2008]. Consider a simultaneous-move game with n players. De-
note a player p, and player p’s set of pure strategies (i.e., actions) Sp. Let
m = maxp |Sp|. Denote a pure strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S, with sp
being player p’s pure strategy. Denote by S−p the set of partial pure strategy
profiles of the players other than p. Player p’s utility under pure strategy profile
s is ups. We assume that utilities are nonnegative integers (but results in this
paper can be straightforwardly adapted to the case of rational utilities). Denote
the largest utility of the game as u.
A correlated distribution is a probability distribution over pure strategy pro-
files, represented by a vector x ∈ RM , where M =
∏
p |Sp|. Then xs is the
probability of pure strategy profile s under the distribution x. A correlated
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distribution x is a product distribution when it can be achieved by each player p
randomizing independently over her actions according to some distribution xp,
i.e., xs =
∏
p x
p
sp . Such a product distribution is also known as a mixed-strategy
profile, with each player p playing the mixed strategy xp.
Throughout the paper we assume that a game is given in a representation
satisfying two properties, following Papadimitriou and Roughgarden [2008]:
• polynomial type: the number of players and the number of actions for each
player are bounded by polynomials in the size of the representation.
• polynomial expectation property: We have access to an algorithm that com-
putes the expected utility of any player p under any product distribution
x, i.e.,
∑
s∈S u
p
sxs, in time polynomial in the size of the representation.
Definition 2.1. A correlated distribution x is a correlated equilibrium (CE) if
it satisfies the following incentive constraints: for each player p and each pair
of her actions i, j ∈ Sp,
∑
s∈S−p
[upis − u
p
js]xis ≥ 0, (1)
where the subscript “is” (respectively “js”) denotes the pure strategy profile in
which player p plays i (respectively j) and the other players play according to
the partial profile s ∈ S−p.
We write these incentive constraints in matrix form as Ux ≥ 0. Thus U
is an N ×M matrix, where N =
∑
p |Sp|
2. The rows of U , corresponding to
the left-hand sides of the constraints (1), are indexed by (p, i, j) where p is a
player and i, j ∈ Sp are a pair of p’s actions. Denote by Us the column of U
corresponding to pure strategy profile s. These incentive constraints, together
with the constraints
x ≥ 0,
∑
s∈S
xs = 1, (2)
which ensure that x is a probability distribution, form a linear feasibility pro-
gram that defines the set of CE. The largest value in U is at most u.
We define the support of a correlated equilibrium x as the set of pure strategy
profiles assigned positive probability by x. Germano and Lugosi [2007] showed
that for any n-player game, there always exists a correlated equilibrium with
support size at most 1 +
∑
p |Sp|(|Sp| − 1) = N + 1−
∑
p |Sp|. Intuitively, such
correlated equilibria are basic feasible solutions of the linear feasibility program
for CE, i.e., they are vertices of the polyhedron defining the feasible region.
Furthermore, these basic feasible solutions involve only rational numbers for
games with rational payoffs (see e.g. Lemma 6.2.4 of [Gro¨tschel et al., 1988]).
3 The Ellipsoid Against Hope Algorithm
In this section, we summarize Papadimitriou and Roughgarden’s Ellipsoid Against
Hope algorithm for finding a sample CE [Papadimitriou, 2005; Papadimitriou
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& Roughgarden, 2008], which can be seen as an efficiently constructive version
of earlier proofs [Hart & Schmeidler, 1989; Nau & McCardle, 1990; Myerson,
1997] of the existence of CE. We will concentrate on the main algorithm and only
briefly point out the numerical issues discussed at length by both Papadimitriou
and Roughgarden [2008] and Stein et al. [2010], as our analysis will ultimately
sidestep these issues.
Papadimitriou and Roughgarden’s approach considers the linear program
max
∑
s∈S
xs (P )
Ux ≥ 0, x ≥ 0,
which is modified from the linear feasibility program for CE by replacing the
constraint
∑
s∈S xs = 1 from (2) with the maximization objective. (P ) either
has x = 0 as its optimal solution or is unbounded; in the latter case, the game
has a correlated equilibrium. Thus one way to prove the existence of CE is to
show the infeasibility of the dual problem
UT y ≤ −1, y ≥ 0. (D)
The Ellipsoid Against Hope algorithm uses the following lemma, versions of
which were also used by Nau and McCardle [1990] and Myerson [1997].
Lemma 3.1 ([Papadimitriou, 2005; Papadimitriou & Roughgarden, 2008]). For
every dual vector y ≥ 0, there exists a product distribution x such that xUT y =
0. Furthermore there exists an algorithm that given any y ≥ 0, computes the
corresponding x (represented by x1, . . . , xn) in time polynomial in n and m.
We will not discuss the details of this algorithm; we will only need the facts
that the resulting x is a product distribution and can be computed in polynomial
time. Note also that the resulting x is symmetric across players if y is symmetric
across players. Lemma 3.1 implies that the dual problem (D) is infeasible (and
therefore a CE must exist): xUT y is a convex combination of the left hand sides
of the rows of the dual, and for any feasible y the result must be less than or
equal to −1.
The Ellipsoid Against Hope algorithm runs the ellipsoid algorithm on the
dual (D), with the algorithm from Lemma 3.1 as separation oracle, which we
call the the Product Separation Oracle. At each step of the ellipsoid algorithm,
the separation oracle is given a dual vector y(i). The oracle then generates the
corresponding product distribution x(i) and indicates to the ellipsoid algorithm
that (x(i)UT )y ≤ −1 is violated by y(i). The ellipsoid algorithm will stop after a
polynomial number of steps and determine that the program is infeasible. Let X
be the matrix whose rows are the generated product distributions x(1), . . . , x(L).
Consider the linear program
[XUT ]y ≤ −1, y ≥ 0, (D′)
and observe that the rows of [XUT ]y ≤ −1 are the cuts generated by the
ellipsoid method. If we apply the same ellipsoid method to (D′) and use a
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separation oracle that returns the cut x(i)UT y ≤ −1 given query y(i), the ellip-
soid algorithm would go through the same sequence of queries y(i) and cutting
planes x(i)UT y ≤ −1 and return infeasible. Presuming that numerical prob-
lems do not arise,2 we will find that (D′) is infeasible. This implies that its dual
[UXT ]α ≥ 0, α ≥ 0 is unbounded and has polynomial size, and thus can be
solved for a nonzero feasible α. We can thus scale α to obtain a probability distri-
bution. We then observe that XTα satisfies the incentive constraints (1) and the
probability distribution constraints (2) and is therefore a correlated equilibrium.
The distribution XTα is the mixture of product distributions x(1), . . . , x(L) with
weights α, and thus can be represented in polynomial space and can be efficiently
sampled from.
One issue remains. Although the matrix XUT is polynomial sized, com-
puting it using matrix multiplication would involve an exponential number of
operations. On the other hand, entries of XUT are differences between expected
utilities that arise under product distributions. Since we have assumed that the
game representation admits a polynomial-time algorithm for computing such
expected utilities, XUT can be computed in polynomial time.
Lemma 3.2 ([Papadimitriou, 2005; Papadimitriou & Roughgarden, 2008]).
There exists an algorithm that given a game representation with polynomial type
and polynomial expectation property, and given an arbitrary product distribu-
tion x, computes xUT in polynomial time. As a result, XUT can be computed
in polynomial time.
4 Our Algorithm
In this section we present our modification of the Ellipsoid Against Hope al-
gorithm, and prove that it computes exact CE. There are two key differences
between our approach and the original algorithm for computing approximate
CE.
1. Our modified separation oracle produces pure-strategy-profile cuts;
2. The algorithm is simplified, no longer requiring a special mechanism to
deal with numerical issues (because pure-strategy-profile cuts can be rep-
resented directly as rows of (D)’s constraint matrix).
2Since each row of (D′)’s constraint matrix XUT may require more bits to represent than
any row of the constraint matrix UT for (D), running the ellipsoid algorithm on (D′) with
the original bounding ball and volume lower bound for (D) would not be sound, and as a
result (D′) is not guaranteed to be infeasible. Indeed, Stein et al. [2010] showed that when
running the algorithm on their symmetric game example, (D′) would remain feasible, and
thus the output of the algorithm would not be an exact CE. Furthermore, since the only CE
of that game that is a mixture of symmetric product distributions is irrational, there is no way
to resolve this issue without breaking at least one of the symmetry and product distribution
properties of the Ellipsoid Against Hope algorithm. For more on these issues and possible
ways to address them, please see Papadimitriou and Roughgarden [2008] and Stein, Parrilo &
Ozdaglar [2010].
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4.1 The Purified Separation Oracle
We start with a “purified” version of Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 4.1. Given any dual vector y ≥ 0, there exists a pure strategy profile
s such that (Us)
T y ≥ 0.
Proof. Recall that Lemma 3.1 states that given dual vector y ≥ 0, a product
distribution x can be computed in polynomial time such that xUT y = 0. Since
x[UT y] is a convex combination of the entries of the vector UT y, there must exist
some nonnegative entry of UT y. In other words, there exists a pure strategy
profile s such that (Us)
T y ≥ xUT y = 0.
The proof of Lemma 4.1 is a straightforward application of the probabilistic
method: since xUT y is the expected value of (Us)
T y under distribution x, which
we denote Es∼x[(Us)
T y], the nonnegativity of this expectation implies the exis-
tence of some s such that (Us)
T y ≥ 0. Like many other probabilistic proofs, this
proof is not efficiently constructive; note that there are an exponential number
of possible pure strategy profiles.
It turns out that for game representations with polynomial type and sat-
isfying the polynomial expectation property, an appropriate s can indeed be
identified in polynomial time. Our approach can be seen as derandomizing the
probabilistic proof using the method of conditional probabilities [Erdos & Sel-
fridge, 1973; Spencer, 1994; Raghavan, 1988]. At a high level, for each player
p our algorithm picks a pure strategy sp, such that the conditional expectation
of (Us)
T y given the choices so far remains nonnegative. This requires us to
compute the conditional expectations, but this can be done efficiently using the
expected utility subroutine guaranteed by the polynomial expectation property.
Lemma 4.2. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm that given
• an instance of a game in a representation satisfying polynomial type and
the polynomial expectation property,
• a polynomial-time subroutine for computing expected utility under any
product distribution (as guaranteed by the polynomial expectation prop-
erty), and
• a dual vector y ≥ 0,
finds a pure strategy profile s ∈ S such that (Us)
T y ≥ 0.
Proof. Given a product distribution x, let x(p→sp) be the product distribution
in which player p plays sp and all other players play according to x. Since x
is a product distribution, x(p→sp)U
T y is the conditional expectation of (Us)
T y
given that p plays sp, and furthermore we have for any p,
xUT y =
∑
sp
[
x(p→sp)U
T y
]
xpsp . (3)
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Algorithm 1 Computes a pure strategy profile s such that (Us)
T y ≥ 0.
1. Given y ≥ 0, identify a product distribution x satisfying xUT y = 0, using
the algorithm described in Lemma 3.1.
2. For each player p,
(a) iterate through actions sp ∈ Sp, and compute x(p→sp)U
T using the
algorithm described in Lemma 3.2, until we find an action s∗p ∈ Sp
such that
[
x(p→s∗p)U
T
]
y ≥ 0.
(b) set x to be x(p→s∗p).
3. The resulting x corresponds to a pure strategy profile s. Output s.
Since xp is a distribution, the right hand side of (3) is a convex combination
and thus there must exist an action sp ∈ Sp such that x(p→sp)U
T y ≥ xUT y ≥ 0.
Since x(p→sp) is a product distribution, this process can be repeated for each
player to yield a pure strategy profile s such that (Us)
T y ≥ xUT y ≥ 0. This is
formalized in Algorithm 1.
We now consider the running time of Algorithm 1. Due to the polynomial ex-
pectation property, the algorithm described in Lemma 3.2 is polynomial, which
implies that in Step 2a, for each sp ∈ Sp, x(p→sp)U
T can be computed in poly-
nomial time. Since Step 2a requires at most |Sp| such computations, and since
polynomial type implies that n and |Sp| are polynomial in the input size, the
algorithm runs in polynomial time.
A straightforward corollary is the following:
Corollary 4.3. Algorithm 1 can be used as a separation oracle for the dual LP
(D) in the Ellipsoid Against Hope algorithm: for each query point y, the oracle
computes the corresponding pure-strategy profile s according to Algorithm 1 and
returns the half space (Us)
T y ≤ −1. We call this the Purified Separation Oracle.
This separation oracle has the following properties:
• Each returned half space is one of the constraints of (D).
• Since Algorithm 1 iterates through the players sequentially, the generated
pure-strategy profiles can be asymmetric even for symmetric games and
symmetric y.
• Since a pure-strategy profile is a special case of a product distribution, the
resulting pure-strategy profile s also satisfies Lemma 3.1, with x being the
unit vector corresponding to s.
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4.2 The Simplified Ellipsoid Against Hope Algorithm
We now modify the Ellipsoid Against Hope Algorithm by replacing the Product
Separation Oracle with our Purified Separation Oracle. The rows of X in (D′)
become unit vectors corresponding to the pure-strategy profiles generated by
the oracle. Thus, we can write (D′) as
(U ′)T y ≤ −1, y ≥ 0, (D′′)
where the matrix U ′ ≡ UXT consists of the columns Us(i) that correspond to
pure-strategy profiles s(i) generated by the separation oracle. Note that each
constraint of (D′′) is also one of the constraints of (D), and as a result nei-
ther the maximum value of the coefficients nor the right-hand sides of (D′′)
are greater than in (D). Therefore, a starting ball and volume lower bound
that are valid for a run of the ellipsoid method on (D) would also be valid for
(D′′). We thus avoid the precision issues faced by the Ellipsoid Against Hope
algorithm, and it is sufficient to use standard values for the initial radius and
volume lower bound (and standard perturbation methods for dealing with non-
full-dimensional solutions). The resulting CE is a mixture over a polynomial
number of pure strategy profiles. We can make a further conceptual simplifi-
cation of the algorithm: instead of using X as in the Ellipsoid Against Hope
algorithm, we can directly treat the generated pure-strategy profiles as columns
of U , and use U ′ in place of UXT .
We now formally state and prove our result. Note that although we only
briefly discussed the way numerical issues are addressed in the original Ellipsoid
Against Hope algorithm in Section 3, we need to go into detail about how
our algorithm ensures its own numerical accuracy. Nevertheless that task is
comparatively easy, as it is sufficient for us to directly apply standard techniques
from the theory of the ellipsoid method. Our analysis makes use of the following
lemma from [Gro¨tschel et al., 1988].
Lemma 4.4 (Lemma 6.2.6, [Gro¨tschel et al., 1988]). Let P = {y ∈ RN |Ay ≤ b}
be a full-dimensional polyhedron defined by the system of inequalities, with the
encoding length of each inequality at most ϕ. Then P contains a ball with radius
2−7N
3ϕ. Moreover, this ball is contained in the ball with radius 25N
2ϕ centered
at 0.
We note that the only restriction on P is full dimensionality; we do not need
to assume that P is bounded, or that A has full row rank.
Theorem 4.5. Given a game representation with polynomial type and polyno-
mial expectation property, Algorithm 2 computes an exact and rational CE with
support size at most 1 +
∑
p |Sp|(|Sp| − 1) in polynomial time.
Proof. We begin by proving the correctness of the algorithm. First, we will show
that the ellipsoid method in Step 1 is a valid run for (D), which certifies that
10
Algorithm 2 Computes an exact rational CE given a game representation
satisfying polynomial type and the polynomial expectation property.
1. Apply the ellipsoid method to (D), using the Purified Separation Oracle,
a starting ball with radius of R = u5N
3
centered at 0, and stopping when
the volume of the ellipsoid is below v = αNu
−7N5 , where αN is the volume
of the N -dimensional unit ball.
2. Form the matrix U ′ whose columns are Us(1) , . . . , Us(L) generated by the
separation oracle during the run of the ellipsoid method.
3. Compute a basic feasible solution x′ of the linear feasibility program
U ′x′ ≥ 0, x′ ≥ 0,1Tx′ = 1, (P ∗)
by applying the ellipsoid method on the explicitly represented (P ∗) and
recovering a basis using, e.g., Algorithm 4.2 of [Dantzig & Thapa, 2003].
4. Output x′ and s(1), . . . , s(L), interpreted as a distribution over pure-
strategy profiles s(1), . . . , s(L) with probabilities x′.
the feasible set of (D) is either empty or not full dimensional.3 Suppose the
contrary, i.e., the feasible set of (D) is feasible and full dimensional. Since the
encoding length of each constraint of (D) is at most N log2 u, then by Lemma
4.4, the feasible set must contain a ball with radius u−7N
4
, and thus volume
αNu
−7N5 , and furthermore this ball must be contained in the ball with radius
u5N
3
centered at 0, which is the initial ball of our ellipsoid method in Step 1.
Since at the end of Step 1 the ellipsoid method certifies that the intersection of
the initial ball and the feasible set has volume less than v = αNu
−7N5 , we reach
a contradiction and therefore either the LP (D) must be infeasible or the feasible
set must not be full dimensional. Since the largest magnitude of the coefficients
in (D′′) is also u, Step 1 is also a valid run for (D′′) and therefore either (D′′)
must be infeasible or the feasible set of (D′′) must not be full dimensional.
Of course a non-full-dimensional feasible set is not sufficient for our purpose;
we now perturb (D′′) to get an infeasible LP. Fix ρ > 1. Perturbing the con-
straints (U ′)T y ≤ −1 of (D′′) by multiplying the RHS by ρ, we get the following
LP:
min 0 (4)
(U ′)T y ≤ −ρ1
y ≥ 0.
3Since the ellipsoid method relies on shrinking the volume of the candidate set, it is not able
to distinguish between non-full-dimensional feasible sets and infeasibility. We overcome this
by perturbing the LP after the ellipsoid method has been applied; another method perturbs
the LP in advance to ensure the feasible set is either empty or full dimensional.
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We claim that (4) is infeasible. Suppose otherwise: then there exists a y ∈ RN
such that y ≥ 0 and (U ′)T y ≤ −ρ1. Let y′ ∈ RN be a vector such that
0 ≤ y′j − yj ≤
ρ−1
Nu for all j. Then y
′ ≥ 0, and each component s of U ′T y′
satisfies
(U ′s)
T y ≤ (U ′s)
T y +
ρ− 1
Nu
∑
j
|U ′js |
≤ −ρ+ ρ− 1
≤ −1.
Thus, any such y′ is feasible for (D′′). However, the set of all such vectors y′ is
a full-dimensional cube. This contradicts the fact that (D′′) is either infeasible
or not full dimensional, and therefore (4) is infeasible. This means that (4)’s
dual
max ρ1Tx′ (5)
U ′x′ ≥ 0
x′ ≥ 0
is unbounded (since it is feasible, e.g. x′ = 0). Then a nonzero feasible vector
x′ is (after normalization) a distribution over the pure strategy profiles corre-
sponding to columns of U ′. Treating it as a sparse representation of a correlated
distribution x, it satisfies the feasibility program for CE and is therefore an exact
CE.
This CE is exact but its support could be greater than 1+
∑
p |Sp|(|Sp| − 1)
(although as we argue below it is still polynomial). To get a CE with the required
support size, we notice that since (5) is unbounded, a feasible solution of the
bounded linear feasibility program (P ∗) is a CE. Note that (P ∗) has the same
set of rows constraints as the feasibility program for CE defined by (1) and (2),
and that for each player p and action i ∈ Sp, the incentive constraint (p, i, i)
corresponds to deviating from action i to itself and is therefore redundant. Thus
the number of bounding constraints of (P ∗) is at most 1+
∑
p |Sp|(|Sp|−1) and
therefore a basic feasible solution x′ of (P ∗) will have the required support size.
Since the coefficients and right-hand sides of (P ∗) are rational, then (by e.g.
Lemma 6.2.4 of [Gro¨tschel et al., 1988]) its basic feasible solution x′ is also
rational and can be represented using at most 4N3u bits.
We now consider the running time of the algorithm. Since Step 1 is a stan-
dard run of the ellipsoid method, it terminates in a polynomial number of it-
erations. For example if we use the ellipsoid algorithm presented in Theorem
3.2.1 of [Gro¨tschel et al., 1988], then by Lemma 3.2.10 of [Gro¨tschel et al., 1988]
the ratio between volumes of successive ellipsoids vol(Ek+1)/vol(Ek) ≤ e
−1/(5N).
With the volume of the initial ellipsoid at most αNR
N and stopping when vol-
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ume is below v, the number of iterations L is at most
5N
[
ln(αNR
N )− ln v
]
= 5N
[
5N4 ln u+ 7N5 lnu
]
= O(N6 lnu),
which is polynomial in the input size since N is polynomial. Since each call
to the separation oracle takes polynomial time by Lemma 4.2, Step 1 takes
polynomial time. L being polynomial also ensures that (P ∗) has polynomial
size, and thus a basic feasible solution can be found in polynomial time.
We note that the estimates on R and v (and thus L) can be improved, but our
main goal here is to prove that the running time of our algorithm is polynomial.
The reader may wonder how our algorithm would deal with Stein et al.
[2010]’s counterexample, a symmetric game in which the only CE that is a con-
vex combination of symmetric product distributions has irrational probabilities.
Since we have proved that our algorithm computes a rational CE as a convex
combination of product distributions, it must violate the symmetry property.
Indeed as we discussed in Section 4.1, our Purified Separation Oracle can re-
turn asymmetric cuts for symmetric games and symmetric queries, and thus for
this game it must return at least one asymmetric cut during the algorithm.
5 Conclusion
We have proposed a polynomial-time algorithm, a variant of Papadimitriou
and Roughgarden’s Ellipsoid Against Hope approach, for computing an exact
CE given a game representation with polynomial type and polynomial expec-
tation property. A key component of our approach is a derandomization of
Papadimitriou and Roughgarden’s separation oracle using the method of condi-
tional probabilities, yielding a polynomial-time separation oracle that outputs
cuts corresponding to pure-strategy profiles. Our approach is then spared from
dealing with the numerical precision issues that were a major focus of previous
approaches, and the algorithm is considerably simplified as a result. Further-
more, the correlated equilibria returned by our algorithm have polynomial-sized
supports. We expect these properties of our algorithm to be independently in-
teresting, beyond its usefulness in resolving the recent uncertainty about the
computational complexity of identifying exact CE.
Our algorithm has additional practical benefits: the resulting cutting planes
are deeper cuts than those produced by the original oracle, resulting in a smaller
number of iterations required to reach convergence, albeit at the cost of more
work per iteration. It is also possible to return cuts corresponding to pure
strategy profiles with (e.g.) good social welfare, yielding a heuristic method for
generating correlated equilibria with good social welfare; we do note, however,
that finding a CE with optimal social welfare is generally NP-hard for many
game representations [Papadimitriou & Roughgarden, 2005].
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